From Philosophy of Technology to Bioethics and Biolaw: Challenges to Peter Kemp's Ethics of the Irreplaceable

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Abstract: This article is based on an exchange between Peter Kemp and Jacob Dahl Rendtorff on the occasion of Peter Kemp's seventieth birthday in 2007. It presents the development of Kemp's ethical philosophy from his philosophy of technology and technology ethics to his philosophy of bioethics and biolaw. It also discusses Kemp's relation to Existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and Marxism with the development of a critical hermeneutic philosophy of engagement. This is related to Kemp's work on humanistic ethics of technology in his book on the ethics of the irreplaceable. The article presents Kemp's long discussion with Paul Ricœur about the ethics of the good life and about narrative ethics. Finally, it elaborates on the bioethical turn towards an ethics for the living world and discusses the role of basic ethical principles of autonomy, dignity, integrity, and vulnerability in relation to cosmopolitan and global responsibility for sustainability and humanity.

Keywords: Peter Kemp, Paul Ricœur, the irreplaceable, engagement, the good life

Introduction

In this article, I present some questions to Peter Kemp's philosophy with Peter's own answers and some of my own additional reflections. Thus, the article is a reflection on this exchange, which happened at a symposium of his seventieth birthday in 2007 and which was published in Danish in the book *Udfordringer: Dialoger med Peter Kemp* (*Challenges: Dialogues with Peter Kemp*) from 2009. The content of this exchange has never been published in English or presented for an international audience, but Peter's answers to my questions are so much to the point

that I could not resist translating the exchange into English and presenting it at the 38th International Eco-ethica Symposium in 2019, devoted to the relation between Peter's philosophy and Eco-ethica. This article begins with my questions to Peter, followed by his answers. I have kept the wording of the text close to his original replies. Throughout the text, we also experience a little bit of Peter's own interpretation of his philosophical journey. Nevertheless, the aim of this article is to motivate debate and reflection about the development, form, and content of Peter Kemp's concrete ethics.

Peter Kemp between Existentialism and Marxism

In an early writing on new French philosophers, Kemp makes a thought-provoking comparison between Nabert and Sartre. Here, Nabert's belief in the philosophy of affirmation and the struggle against radical evil are juxtaposed with Sartre's philosophy of nothingness and unhappy desire. Another source of Kemp's philosophy of affirmation is the philosophy of Bergson, with its focus on the inner experience, the body, and on creative auto-poetics of life. One of Kemp's favorite philosophers was Henri Bergson, and he wrote his master's dissertation on Bergson's philosophy of the self, which he was very proud of. Kemp's philosophy of affirmation is also inspired by Ricœur, and this approach to philosophy can be found in Kemp's theory of engagement, including the poetics and the pathetics. In this work, ethics is not directly visible, but it is a clear consequence of the philosophy of engagement that ethics is central to the philosophy of affirmation.

In fact, this is already true in Kemp's book on the philosophy of the youth rebellion of 1968, which also deals with the concept of engagement. During the 1970s, Kemp wrote several books on Marxism, which, although they are not totally in favor of radical revolution, are about the political philosophy of engagement. We may already find the ontological basis for this ethical philosophy in Kemp's reading of Derrida in the book *Døden og maskinen* (*Death and the Machine*), in which Derrida is interpreted existentially as a philosopher who, behind deconstruction, is concerned about human existence in the encounter with the machine and with the death of technology.

This leads to my first question for Kemp's philosophy that I had the opportunity to ask him about at the time of the symposium on Peter Kemp's philosophy: How should we understand the connection between the philosophical theory of engagement, the reading of Marxism in France, and then the discussion of the technique and death in *Death and the Machine*? Can one really combine phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy, poetic theology, Marxism and then an existentialist ethic? Does Kemp not end up in some hopeless eclecticism, just as you can sometimes accuse his master Paul Ricœur of, or is it possible to rank the various positions into a coherent theory of the ontological basis of ethics?

Kemp's Answer about Engagement and Marxism

In his answer to this question Kemp explained that he was coming back from France and interested in Marxist literature through his 1972 book *Sprogets dimensioner* [*The Dimensions of the Language*) which together with his 1973 dissertation *Théorie de l'engagement I-II* (*Theory of Engagement*), was strongly inspired by Paul Ricœur, and therefore Kemp's perspective on Marxism differed from that of his Danish colleagues.

Kemp points to the fact that his 1975 book *Nyt lys over Marx* (*New Light on Marx*) was not considered philosophically correct by the orthodox Marxists, because he was more concerned with Hegelianism and the human view of Marx than with criticism of capitalism and "capital logic." Therefore, he was considered as "the last revolutionary," and in a review in the Danish newspaper *Information*, he was counted as the "fifth column of the youth rebellion." Kemp points to the fact that he did not consider the Marxist ideas in the youth revolt as the most interesting. Later Kemp wrote about the "new philosophers and the crisis of Marxism" in his book *Marxismen i Frankrig* (*Marxism in France*), although at the time it was published, in 1978, it was not yet so prevalent among old Neomarxists to talk about the crisis of Marxism. He mentions that in 1979 he also wrote a chronicle in the newspaper *Politiken* called "Marxist eller revolutionær" ("Marxist or Revolutionary"), in which he claimed that Marxism had to be overtaken "left over" (February 6). Kemp mentions that this expression brought Danish philosophers Ole Thyssen and Michael Larsen to the barricades (February 26), and Kemp replied (March 1) that they were "two Pavlovian dogs" who provided a display of scholastic Marxist conceptual gymnastics.

I think that Peter's replies to my question demonstrates my initial idea that we find the core of his philosophy in the combination between the existentialist and political engagement. This is seen from the perspective of French philosophy and inspired by Ricœur and Sartre with a concern for combining the political engagement of philosophy with existentialist reflections on the philosophy and theology of the engagement. Accordingly, Peter's ethics has a political perspective related to social criticism and engagement in politics of society as a public intellectual.

From Marxism to Humanism and Technology Research

Kemp's development of ethics during the 1980s combines ethics and politics with philosophy of technology. This is done through the collaboration with Georges Thill, and it was the basis of their book *Henimod et teknologisk demokrati* (*Towards a Technological Democracy*). The title falls into the contemporary anxiety of the technologies and of doomsday visions à la *1984* by George Orwell. It is an ethical approach to technology, and it was closely linked to contemporary discussions of avoiding an expert society and taking over the humanity of human beings through technologies. It was a political project on democratizing society, but it was also a philosophical project to make the world more humanistic. During social and political crises of the 1980s Kemp developed a project of combining humanism and technology by giving

humanists the knowledge necessary to work with the engineers and scientific experts to solve social, political, and technological problems of society. Thus, it was also an educational project on the creation of a more modern humanities, as evidenced by Kemp's 1986 pamphlet *Hum.Tek.—Studiet: Uddannelsen i Humanistisk Teknologi* (*Hum.Tek.—The Study: Education in Humanistic Technology*).

However, the time was not quite right for humanism and technology in the 1980s, and the University of Copenhagen would not establish this program. It is therefore not without irony that today we are screaming for humanists with technological competence and technologists who understand humanities and philosophy, and that we still face the same problems today. It is thought provoking that the Humtek project later was realized at Roskilde University, where we now have a program about Hum-tek. However, it is also interesting that something has happened to the concept of Hum-tek over the thirty-five years since Peter Kemp started working on the subject. It has moved away from technology criticism and ethics towards creativity and design. Today one does not primarily study Hum-tek to become a socially engaged humanist, but rather to become a design humanist with high creativity in dealing with the technology of the future, including social media, IT, AI, and robots. Aesthetics has moved into the place of ethics, and today we are fascinated by technology's potential for the creative human being, rather than by its dangers, even though Peter's problems of technology dominance, control society and social inequality, and degradation of human dignity are as central today as they were in the 1980s.

The central question that I thus asked Kemp was whether the Hum-tek idea in its basic forms needs to be fundamentally revised or whether we can maintain ethics of new technology as central to our contemporary reflections. How can we make technology criticism in our time, where technology pessimism is in many cases overpowered by a high degree of optimism regarding the creativity and possibilities of the new technology? Can we combine aesthetics and ethics, and how does that relate to Hum-tek? Perhaps one should find Kemp's early inspiration from Henri Bergson to discuss this issue—the Hum–tek philosophy centers on *élan vital*, the creative human being in the flow of time between nature and spirit.

Kemp's Answer about Humanism and Technology

In answering the questions Kemp confirmed that he wanted to do something other than preaching Marxism, even though he wrote, "We are all Marxists; the question is just how we are it." In *Challenges: Dialogues with Peter Kemp*, he confirms that he wanted to develop the political philosophy of engagement and that he found the weakness of Marxism in its uncritical concept of technology. He argues that no distinction was made between good and bad technology, but all technology was considered well. This led to Peter's participation in the protest against nuclear power plants in Denmark and to the technology criticism in his 1980 book *Technologies et Sociétés*, written in collaboration with his friend Georges Thill, a philosopher trained

in atomic physics, and Pierre-Philippe Druet, whose contribution consisted mostly in formulating the book in full French.

Peter told me that the French style also infected the Danish translation he did himself, so when it came out under the title *Henimod et teknologisk demokrati* (*Towards a Technological Democracy*), it received harsh treatment by a doctor who, with no interest in the substance, reviewed it in Peter's own newspaper, *Politiken*. Moreover, in France, where nuclear power plants were built at full power, the book did not break through either. This was the reason Peter wanted to start from the ground up in the pedagogy and in the first half of the 1980s tried to set up the degree in "Humanistic Technology" at the University of Copenhagen. Kemp had the support of Minister of Education Bertel Haarder, and several committees were set up to get the degree program designed and introduced. However, it met fierce opposition in the Faculty of Science, academic home of University Rector and famous physician Ove Nathan. Though he personally looked favorably on the education, he did not dare go against the dean of this faculty, and the plan was stifled. Therefore, Peter now felt that he owed nothing to the University of Copenhagen and accepted the invitation to a year's guest professorship in Gothenburg (1987–1988), where he worked together with famous historian of ideas Sven Eric Liedman. Here, for the first time, Peter gave lectures that, after being repeated in German at Vienna's Technical University in 1989 and 1990, became the book *Det uerstattelige: En teknologi-etik* (*The Irreplaceable: A Technology Ethics*). This book was published in 1991 in Danish, Swedish, German, and French. Unfortunately, however, it was never published in English because the translation was of such a low quality.

Peter answered that he was convinced that the idea of a Hum-tek education should be implemented in some form or another in different places. He thought the turn at Roskilde University was interesting, but he also mentioned Aalborg University, and in particular today's program of applied philosophy. However, in many ways it can be said that the large Institute of Management, Politics and Philosophy at the Copenhagen Business School is also a way of realizing an education where the humanities and technical-scientific disciplines come together. Peter argued that today's focus on technology and design would not necessarily exclude the technology criticism they had in mind with Hum-tek in the 1980s. He emphasized that there must still be an ethical responsibility for what one creates and designs.

Peter agreed with me that his dealings with technology criticism did not mean abandoning his interest in ethics and philosophy of existence. Indeed, he agreed with the interpretation of Jacques Derrida as an existentialist, and in his 1981 book about Derrida, Kemp called for an ethic in his thinking. The book *Death and the Machine* was according to Kemp about how technology in our structuring and "deconstruction" of life can be used both for good and for evil—just like Captain Nemo's submarine in Jules Verne's *20,000 Leagues Under the Sea: A World Tour Underwater*. Peter told me that Derrida had read most of the chapters that he had first written as a lecture in French, and that Derrida did not disagree with him. Peter said that he remem-

bered Derrida sitting in his living room saying, "I don't mind ethics." However, Peter emphasizes that it was only in his later writing that his ethical commitment became apparent. Until then, Derrida was more Nietzschean and Heideggerian than Kantian.

Peter's answers to my questions about technology and ethics confirm how he combines existentialist and political philosophy in his thinking. This was why I spoke on Sartre's concept of the political self and the philosopher as a public intellectual at the 2018 Eco-ethica symposium in Copenhagen and Roskilde. I think that this effort to combine reflections on existence and engagement with public engagement and political and social philosophy is very essential to Peter's philosophy. Indeed, it is interesting that Peter mentions the combination of philosophy with the study of management, politics, and economics as the continuation of his research on philosophy of technology. With this statement, I find it easy to place my own philosophy of management and ethics of leadership in organizations in the tradition of Peter's philosophy.

Towards the Ethics of the Irreplaceable

As far as I can see, in the mid-1980s, a deep focus on ethics began to emerge in Kemp's writing. Political engagement moves in the direction of ethics. It is very clear with his article about medical ethics in the book *Medicinsk Etik* (*Medical Ethics*) by Andersen, Mabeck, and Riis in 1985 (later published in French as *Éthique et Médicine*). In this work, the idea of the good life and the ethics in extension of Aristotle takes on a central importance. Aristotle's notion of the good and happy life and his focus on practical sense are not seen much in the works of the 1970s, so one might wonder why Aristotle now was highlighted as the true founder of ethics.

How can Aristotle be combined with the idea of engagement, and why is it with the classical philosopher that we must find the solution to our contemporary problems of ethics? Perhaps the answer is that after the 1970s it had become impossible to make sense of the concept of morality, and that we must therefore go back to the roots of ethics. Nevertheless, the question that remains is "Why back to Aristotle?" when we justify ethics. It can in this context be emphasized that Aristotle, in Kemp's latest work on *Verdensborgeren*, in 2005 (*Citizen of the World* [2010]), seems to have resigned in favor of Kant.

The article on medical ethics, however, is in many ways the nucleus of *The Irreplaceable: A Technology Ethics*, Kemp's second major work, from 1991, the second Habilitation after *Théorie de l'Engagement I–II*. We see indeed that this work later becomes central to the work of the citizen of the world, of which the core ideas are already present in *The Irreplaceable*. In fact, Aristotle is also quite significant in *The Irreplaceable*. There is talk of the vision of the good life, of *phronesis* as practical reason, of values such as the modern interpretation of Aristotle's concept of goods, and of the difficult middle, as the place where decision-making should balance. Nevertheless, at the same time, the focus on phenomenological ethics is deepened in Kemp's descrip-

tion of the tension between Levinas's proximity ethics and Hans Jonas's ethics for future generations. *The Irreplaceable* also unfolds in particular the Kantian dimension of human dignity as inviolable and irreplaceable. The irreplaceable is largely influenced by the notion that ethics can become concrete and should go to solve society's ethical problems. From the perspective of Kemp's philosophy, it is possible, by using the practical sense of the word *phronesis* to analyze and engage responsibly in society's ethical and political problems. One issue that comes to mind when looking at the ethical framework for this work is the possibilities and limits of phenomenological ethics. On the one hand, ethics is phenomenological, hermeneutic, and concrete, and on the other hand, the ethical problems have a technical and abstract nature that makes them difficult to solve on the phenomenological and hermeneutic basis. The question is what can really be done about this dilemma and we may also ask whether phenomenology is at all a fruitful approach to ethics, as it seems far from allowing us to understand the ethics of society in its complexity.

As far as I can see, it is the narrative approach to ethics that should solve this problem. It seems that the narrative can capture the complexity in a way that cannot be dealt with directly in philosophy. The concept of the irreplaceable emphasizes that the narrative and the mythic-symbolic language are the place where we can arrive at ethics. It is the stories and narratives that bring ethics to life. This may be very good, you can answer, but where are the stories in Peter's philosophical work? Kemp actually uses very little of various narrative forms to illustrate his ethics. In fact, the narrative is exemplary, but can it really contribute as much as it can according to protection of human dignity? One might ask here whether Kemp's focus on storytelling and the good life does not in fact make him a kind of communitarian who has cut himself off from his connection to Kantianism and the world citizen philosophy? If this is the case, there is a huge problem in combining his ethics of the irreplaceable with the philosophy of the world citizen!

Perhaps the realization of the limited possibilities of the narrative were the reason why Kemp now published the small book on Lévinas with its focus on the ethics of the Other. Here we see that the tradition of Nabert and Bergson are put aside in the discussion of ethics. Sartre has now completely fallen into the background, and it is the focus on affirmation that is central. It is probably also related to the private circumstances of the author's life, cf. the picture on the back of the book, where Peter depicts himself together with his newborn son Ask. In any case, it is characteristic that for a time Lévinas gains the upper hand over Ricœur. Indeed, Ricœur does not agree with Kemp's high priority of narrative ethics, and one could argue that the moral norm is very central to the ethical vision of Ricœur's small ethics in *Soî-même comme un Autre*. Yet, it is thought-provoking that Kemp's 2001 book on Ricœur's Ethics is *Practical Wisdom*. The question is, "What Aristotelianism constitutes the very basis of ethics, as Kemp reads Ricœur's ethics?" In addition, we can ask whether Peter forgets the focus on Kant by designating the book with the term *practical wis-*

dom? Moreover, has his focus on Lévinas as the basis of ethics not led Kemp too far away from Ricœur when it comes to ethics?

Kemp's Answer about Ethics and the Good Life

In the answer to these questions, Peter Kemp confirms that he seriously took up ethics in the article "Ethical View of Life and Moral Practice," which was an introduction to *Medical Ethics* from 1985 and a few years later was published in French under the title *Éthique et Médicine*. Ricœur visited Kemp in Denmark when he had this book in proof. He read the entire book on Kemp's couch and gave him many good linguistic corrections, which the publisher unfortunately did not include in the published book. However, Peter emphasizes that the idea of using Aristotle as the basis for ethics did not really come from Ricœur. It came from American philosopher Robert C. Solomon, whose little book, *Ethics: A Brief Introduction* (McGraw-Hill, 1984), Kemp had found on his trip to the United States in 1984. Admittedly, an Aristotelian view of ethics was a way to keep up with Ricœur's phenomenological thinking, but Peter emphasizes here that it was this one time that Kemp inspired Ricœur much more than the other way around. At least Peter emphasizes that this is the one of his books that Ricœur has most frequently cited!

However, Peter argues that Ricœur's point of departure for ethics was Kantian rather than founded on narratives. We can see this in Ricœur's essay "The Problem of Moral Basis" from 1975. The basis of the moral law was the freedom and defense of the other's freedom. That led to a debate between Kemp and Ricœur for twelve years. In 1986, Kemp had written an article in French about "Ethics and Narrativity," translated into Danish in the journal *Slagmark*, no. 10 (1987). Here Kemp argued that the basis of ethics is a narrative vision derived from our wishes, dreams, and hopes. Kemp based this on his experience of the narrative as an approach to an understanding of a good life in the Aristotelian sense. Through an analysis of Ricœur's work on *Time and Narrative*, Kemp had sought to show that there was an implicit ethic in Ricœur's theory of mimesis, and that the narratives of the good life were the basis of all ethics. In a reply in the same issue of *Slagmark*, Ricœur stated that he was pleased with Kemp's exploration of the ethical dimension of the narrative, as he himself had analyzed it in his work on *Time and Narrative*. However, Ricœur pointed out that he regarded the resistance to violence as the basis of ethics and that he did depart from MacIntyre's Aristotelianism in the 1981 book *After Virtue*, and thus also from Kemp's assertion of the narrative basis of ethics. Instead, he attributed "the imperatives, that is, the deontological dimension, a function that cannot be reduced to the optives [preferences] expressed by the assessments of the good qualities." He added straight out: "In this piece I am on Kant's side."

Peter adds that he also could have said that he was on the side of Lévinas. Throughout the 1980s, Kemp read all of Lévinas's philosophical works, because he was interested in understanding the basis of ethics, and because his philosophy in the international debate was increasingly regarded as the ethics of excellence. However,

he was so different from everyone else that Kemp had a hard time understanding him. However, Kemp, told me that he slowly became acquainted with Lévinas by analyzing his relationship with Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's 1927 analysis of *Sein und Zeit* and Franz Rosenzweig's 1921 book, *Philosophy of Religion in the Star of Redemption*. Peter Kemp saw Lévinas's philosophy as much more than an ethics in the narrow sense, namely as a philosophy of our emotional and sensible connection with the world prior to any encounter with the other, with his "face" or the claim arising from the bodily encounter with the other. Kemp was particularly convinced by Lévinas's criticism of Heidegger, whom Lévinas both admired and hated. He admired Heidegger's perception of being as an act or existence, but he hated his idea that we have "fallen" into the world and must fight to assert ourselves. For Lévinas, the world was given as the "daily bread" we live by. It is not just a place for our assertion, but a gift, a grace. This view of the world Kemp found was completely in line with the world concept of Aristotle and Ricœur. And this is really an interpretation of the original affirmation from Nabert. Then Lévinas could even reconcile it with the idea of the strict ethical claim we otherwise know from Kant. Nevertheless, there was no meaning in Lévinas's idea of storytelling for understanding ethical life. Therefore, on a significant point, Kemp had to disagree more with him than with Ricœur. Kemp considered Levinas's claim of the displacement of love and happiness understood as mutually given and received between persons, the happiness we only know in a narrative experience, to be conceived as part of our life story.

Ricœur and Kemp continued the discussion in different ways until, in a 1999 lecture in Chicago on "Narrative Ethics and Moral Law in Ricœur," Kemp proposed to resolve the issue in that the narrative vision was not considered the sole condition of ethics. As other conditions that were relevant for ethics, Kemp mentioned the meeting with the other and the experience of both love and violence. Nevertheless, Kemp also maintained that without understanding life through the narrative, we cannot understand what it means to act for good and evil. Ricœur sat in the front row, Kemp remembers, and when Kemp afterwards asked Ricœur if he had anything to note about this point of view, Ricœur replied that he had not. Therefore, Kemp was sure that they had agreed, but also that he would have given up if he ever thought that ethics could be understood solely on the basis of the narrative. But Peter had also reminded Ricœur that precisely in his "little ethics" in the book *One Self as Another* from 1990, the Aristotelian vision was set as the first moment of ethics; then the Kantian norm was inserted as the second step that purifies the bad and harmful stories by asking what can be universally valid; however, the third step was a return to the vision in cases where the norm falls short of the specific situation. Thus, the narrative vision was also fundamental in Ricœur's philosophy. Moreover, Kemp insisted that this was what he wanted to highlight in his book about Ricœur's ethics, *Practical Wisdom*, from 2001.

This was Peter's answers to the questions about the evolution of his ethics in the context of philosophical theory of engagement, the reading of Marxism in France,

and the discussion of the technique and death in *Death and the Machine*. But Kemp also answered the question about how he could reconcile an almost communitarian idea of the narrative's significance to the Aristotelian vision of the good life with Kant's ethics, which unfolds the categorical imperative as a universal norm of never treating a human being as a pure means, but also always as goals in themselves. At the end of the second volume of *Théorie de L'Engagement*, Kemp had promised to take up ethics, and thus it was always the philosophical aim (Kemp also had a theological aim, but he did not get the institutional opportunities to complete it, as he was employed in philosophy). However, Kemp said, the ethics was not drafted as a third volume of the theory of engagement; it, on the other hand, took shape through criticism of Marxism and discussions with Derrida. Lévinas and Ricœur, working on medical ethics and, on the whole, the answers to the technological (and not just medical-technological) challenges that Kemp gathered in a systematic presentation in the *Irreplaceable*. Kemp told me that he did not reach the title of this book, until the final stage of the writing process. Here Kemp discovered that the Kantian idea in *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten* about the infinite value of the human being, meaning that the individual is "without equivalence," thus irreplaceable, and he sought that it was this idea that could sum up what he wanted to defend as the right basis for any application of technology. Kemp later often called this ethics a post-Kantian Aristotelian ethics because he used Aristotle's idea of the good life, especially as it is known from true friendship, in such a way that it could indicate the intention of caring for each irreplaceable person both in the personal relationships and in the community.

This answer to my questions is clarifying for my interpretation of Peter Kemp's philosophy and concrete ethics. The friendship and close relation between Peter and Ricœur is striking, and it is very interesting how Kemp affected Ricœur's development of his ethics through the book *Éthique et Médicine*. In turn, it is also interesting that Ricœur's insistence on the Kantian dimension and on the categorical foundations of morality affected Peter's philosophy and moved him away from the pure Aristotelian basis of his ethics. What we can learn for Eco-ethica, I think, is to benefit from the close relation and tension between Kemp and Ricœur in the interpretation of philosophers like Aristotle, Kant, and Lévinas. With this ethics of technology, combined with the philosophy of engagement and political and social criticism, Kemp managed to combine the ethics of the close relation to the other with the ethics of distance, which is necessary in the modern world with its many problems and social and environmental challenges.

From Ethics to Bioethics: The Bioethical Turn

With Peter Kemp's *The Irreplaceable* in 1991, he can be said to have reached a turning point where his philosophy was accomplishing several important philosophical turns. *The Irreplaceable* was already marked by a turning towards the concrete. In addition, this is deepened with Kemp's turn towards bioethics. Now, Kemp was talking

about the bioethical turn completed in an *anthropocentrifugal* turn, with its foundation in *The Irreplaceable*. There was also a movement from ethics to law and justice. This is a turn towards philosophy of law. It became the basis for the research project "Bioethics and Law," which was sponsored by the five Danish Research Councils after a very dramatic funding process in which Professor of Theology Svend Andersen of Aarhus University also received a large grant on Bioethics. In the following years a polemic competition ensued between the two projects: one based on analytical philosophy and utilitarianism, and the other based on phenomenology hermeneutics and philosophy of law. Thus, the project on Bioethics and Law was phenomenological and hermeneutic, but it was in fact also inspired by an Aristotelian philosophy of law, which, after all, characterized one of the other co-founders of the Center for Ethics and Law established in 1993, namely Peter Høilund. His book on *Den forbudte retsfølelse* (*The Prohibited Sense of Justice*) focuses on the relation between the good and the right as the basis for the judicial decision. The bioethical turn was in this context thought to be biological shift towards the body and the rights of the body as the doctrinal basis of law—strongly inspired by the evolution of French legal thinking in the 1990s. One can now ask what the bioethical and *anthropocentrifugal* turn means for the phenomenological basis of ethics and how this relates to Peter's general conception of ethics, including the relation between Peter's concrete ethics and Eco-ethica. Can we say that these changes, twists and turns largely represent a move away from Lévinas's phenomenology of the intimate encounter toward respect for living nature and human interaction with nature?

The bioethical turn was intended as a turn towards an ethics for the whole living world to be included in the reflections on the good life. The idea was that the ethics revolving around the protection of every human being's potential for freedom and self-expression had come to be about protecting the living organisms and their physicality against the interventions that reduce life and the living beings to be objects of increased manipulation, not least through use of modern biotechnology and biochemistry. This means that ethics is extended to become a bioethics that takes into account the dignity, integrity and vulnerability of the body, and limits the biotechnological and biochemical interventions in life and the living world.

Kemp, Mette Lebech, and Rendtorff emphasized in the book *Den bioetiske vending* (*The Bioethical Turn*) from 1997 that the turn of ethics towards the other and the whole living world implied a re-evaluation of the relationship between ethics and law. This was a revolt against the dominant theorists of positivism, not least the Dane Alf Ross, who in the twentieth century has distinguished sharply between ethics and law.

According to the positivist position, ethics was reduced to concern, care, and mercy in close relationships, while the law was perceived as a requirement to uphold a social order and thus sanction the obedience to a ruler.

The point of the bioethical turn was that such a distinction between ethics and law today is being challenged by the requirements of legal regulations that emanate

from bioethics and lead to the need to develop a biolaw, which includes respect for the living world. The courts should give up the rationalistic prejudice that ethics and justice have nothing to do with each other and that justice is a meaningless concept. Again, with the bioethical turn of ethics and law, it becomes meaningful to talk about justice as the idea that expresses the good life on the community level and that links the law to ethics.

As co-author of the book, there are a number of issues that I have always been puzzled by, which I asked Kemp about. The first question was the problem of the *anthropocentrifugal* turn. I can understand that animals need well-being, but can one really give the whole living world an ethical status, and how can ethics in particular help to give us ethical formulation competency and expertise about, for example, greenhouse effect and climate problems? Wasn't the problem of bioethical turn, first and foremost, an ontologization of the living human body as irreplaceable? After all, the body can be difficult to use as the basis for a firm foundation for ethics, as it is constantly changing and also because it has now become possible to construct the human being according to people's autonomy and free will. How can one view the body's ethical possibilities today, more than twenty years after the bioethical turn? A further issue is the ontological status of the legal subject. In his position of philosopher of law, Høilund was close to natural law's ontologization of the human right to self-realization, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas. Others in the group were closer to Habermas's procedural and Ricœur's judgmental approach to human rights as the foundation of basic rights. In addition, the concept of biorights was further favored as the foundation of legal considerations in bioethics. So the question is, how we are to conceptualize the foundation of the basic principles of the law in the contemporary situation?

The fruitful result of the Center for Ethics and Justice's work was the EU-funded research project on bioethics (1995–1998), which led to the Kemp and Rendtorff's *Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw* (2000). Here, the principles of respect for human autonomy, dignity, integrity, and vulnerability were proposed as fundamental values of a common European legislation on bioethics. The principles were conceived as an expression of an extension of human rights to the protection of the human body in medicine and biology. Thus, the principles of respect for autonomy, dignity, integrity, and vulnerability help to humanize biotechnological development, as they are based on a humanistic view of humanity, which is based on the democratic ideals of equality, freedom, and solidarity.

These principles have been considered by many to be the hallmark of the contribution to research on bioethics and biolaw by the Center for Ethics and Law. They can be perceived as being closely related to phenomenological body ethics and Kemp's philosophy of the irreplaceable. Once you have been involved in developing them, it may be difficult to criticize them, but I nevertheless asked Kemp some questions about how he thought they placed themselves in his philosophical landscape and how they can be justified.

First of all: how and how far does the role of principles go in relation to the concept of the good life? What to say about the phenomenological basis of the principles? Moreover, what to say about the problem of vulnerability as a basic ethical condition? How can we mobilize the principles in relation to society's increasing modeling of Homo Sapiens 2.0, i.e., the constructivist account of the phenomenological ontology? Finally, to form a bridge from the bioethics to Kemp's turn toward the world citizen and cosmopolitan philosophy: how can the principles join international law and be mobilized in the movement from being European principles to being foundational principles for governance at the international level? The question was—more specifically—How could we get the principles integrated more strongly into one of the Center's research projects on ethical principles in international law and international politics that was developed with Peter Kemp's focus on cosmopolitanism and Eco-ethica? On the other hand, the other way around: Where is the limit for their use in this context? Do they find their fundamental boundary in bioethics and bioethics?

Kemp's Answer about the Future of the Ethical Principles

In his answer to this question about how he could go from the medical ethics and the ethics of the body to the adoption of an ethics for our relationship with the living world and finally to the idea of world citizenship and the associated international law, Peter Kemp explained his conception of the bioethical turn. He accepted that it is right to start from the concept he launched in *The Irreplaceable* on the *anthropocentrifugal* view of nature. Kemp explains that he invented the term by looking at his washing machine as it spins, and in particular when it tosses the clothes from the center to the sides. Kemp put this concept in contrast to the anthropocentric view of nature, after which everything is seen from the human subject, and partly also the holistic view that one must disregard man and look at everything from nature itself. However, Peter argued, already in the personal relationship with the other human being, if there is any consideration at all, we must go beyond ourselves and seek to look at the relationship from the other's perspective. This means that the idea of the good life excludes pure subjectivism. Conversely, it makes no sense to assume that we can see the world without doing so from a particular perspective or point of view. Therefore, according to Peter the good life also excludes pure objectivism.

In relation to the question of application of the principles to the whole world, so that for example our attitude to the greenhouse effect and climate problems could be determined by the ethical principles, Peter replied that this was not always the case.

Kemp insisted that he had never said that the principle of autonomy, as the assumption of human freedom for its own decisions, could be extended to the whole of nature or simply to the animals. Nevertheless, the other three principles of respect for dignity, integrity, and vulnerability can all in one sense or another be applied in relation to everything living and in relation to the ecological balance in, e.g., climate conditions. For example, dignity means that something outside myself has a value that I must cherish, and furthermore that its maintenance requires consideration

of its fragile integrity (which does not merely mean that it has a zone of immobility, but a connection in time and space), so this can be said just as much about the living nature as about the individual. Without regard to the integrity and vulnerability of humanity, humanity goes down. Therefore, it has a dignity that we must not violate.

In doing so, Peter argued, he had provided the prerequisite for applying ethics to world citizenship and for justifying a modern international law based on all the principles. Here, of course, he said, the principle of autonomy also applies, because in every citizen and community, the independence of the individual must be respected, insofar as it is not unfolded so that it harms others or the entire social life. Thus, Peter does not agree with those who believe that the principle of vulnerability is the only one applicable in ethics and law. This principle has never been thought of as adequate. It was originally thought of as the principle of dignity and integrity as a supplement to the principle of autonomy, and the principles are also weakened if they do not complement each other and are thought in context. Incidentally, Peter argued, respect for integrity is at least as important as the vulnerability consideration. It is integrity that is understood as the context of life in our history and in the social and natural space that is vulnerable. The vulnerability makes no sense at all in ethics without the assumption of this life context. This must be a fundamental phenomenological experience in ethics.

Peter insisted that this is also true when ethics is extended to world citizenship and ecological balance. He argued that it must be obvious that sustainable development requires the care of this life context. Accordingly, in his book *Citizen of the World*, he mentions two other global problems besides maintaining sustainable development: partly the democratization of the global economy, and partly the peace between cultures and nations. Economic globalization is a technical system that threatens the vulnerable freedom, dignity, and integrity of human beings, if it fails to democratize with just institutions, as has been the case with many national economies. The complexity of this system makes democratization difficult, but Peter refused to believe that it is impossible to democratize and humanizethe global economy on the basis of a phenomenological ethics. Finally, Peter argued, peace between nations and cultures will never be guaranteed if we fail to respect individuals from different cultures with their particular dignity and life forms, history, sensibility, religion, etc. This is how the four principles apply to the world citizen and world cultures to a great extent.

Kemp said that if international law is the basis for transnational institutions and jurisprudence, then world citizenship needs to create a framework for a good life and to protect the individual and the peoples of a world from these major transnational problems, and the four principles must of course also be understood as the basis of this international law. Peter emphasized that the four principles also should be seen as the basis for international law, but my questions had led him to do so.

Peter Kemp's answers to the questions about the bioethical turn, sustainability and the ethical principles oriented to be the basis for cosmopolitanism and international law are very useful for further work on the basic ethical principles in bio-

ethics and biolaw. In fact, since our common work on bioethics and biolaw I have continued to work on the principles in business ethics, philosophy of management, and environmental ethics, and ethics of sustainability. Moreover, since 2015 Peter and I were invited several times to South America, where the international network on biolaw has developed on the basis of our initial development of the principles in bioethics and biolaw. Indeed, I think that Peter's concrete ethics constitute an important foundation of Eco-ethica. This becomes clear when we look back on his analysis of technology ethics between Aristotle and Kant. With its further development in relation to sustainability and cosmopolitanism, we can also observe many similarities between Tomonobu Imamichi's philosophy of technological conjuncture and the new virtues of the technological age and Peter Kemp's ethical principles. Thus, this constitutes a framework for understanding the role of Peter Kemp as the president of the Institute of Eco-ethica.

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